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Abstract 
This paper develops a new governance scheme for a stable and lasting European Monetary Union (EMU). I 
demonstrate that existing economic governance is based on flawed incentives especially due to insufficient 
macroeconomic coordination, failures of institutional enforcement and animal spirit in financial markets. All this 
caused the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Consequently, the EMU crisis is not a conundrum at all 
rather a failure of national and supranational governance. To tackle this problem, I propose a return to flexible 
but compulsory rules driven by market forces. The new governance principles shall promote the compliance and 
effective enforcement of rules. 
Keywords: economic governance, eurozone, euro crisis, animal spirit 
1. Introduction 
Since 2010, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is in an economic and political crisis. The recent rescue 
packages were necessary to mitigate the liquidity problems of financial institutions and to stabilise the real 
economy in the Eurozone. However, there is a lively debate whether this strategy will lead to sound economic 
governance in Europe (Jonas, 2006; Herzog, 2011). The short-term rescue philosophy might trigger the wrong 
developments needed for a long-term solution (The Economist, 2011). Indeed, I argue that following the recent 
policy agenda rather lead to a future break-up than a lasting monetary union. Therefore, I propose a new and 
effective governance scheme that solves the past and current problems. In the end, only a return to flexible but 
binding and enforceable rules is an effective solution. 
Of course, a first-best solution requires a governance scheme guided by market forces. Though, the first-best 
option is neither achievable nor realistic in Europe. Hence in a second-best scenario, the governance scheme 
should follow decisive rules and at least imitate the role of market forces. I will follow this line, which is a 
unique idea in the literature of governance and a smart solution for the Eurozone. The flawed incentives that 
allowed this and other crises to emerge illustrate the proposed rule design. 
In section 2, I show that the present rescue plan does not solve the fundamental problems and is unsuitable to 
tackle the long-run issues of the EMU. Moreover, it is common knowledge that the European integration process 
and rescue facilities are driven by path dependency which, however, is insufficient to tackle the huge structural 
problems. Thus, the inherent policy action in the past years put EMU comprehensively at risk. Actually, the 
occurrence of new stabilisation facilities and programmes demonstrate that EMU is at a crossroads. 
There exists a consensus that good governance is a prerequisite for a successful and sustainable currency union 
(Escolano et al., 2012; Schuknecht et al., 2011). Sustainable economic governance does not need too many rules. 
On the contrary, it requires effective rules and a depoliticised or automatic enforcement that is driven by market 
forces. No doubt, the past crisis has transformed European economic governance. There are several new 
institutions for instance the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) that further reduce the incentives for Eurozone countries to bear the consequences of their own policy 
actions. Hence, the new institutions will exacerbate negative externalities and moral hazard. Economic literature 
elucidates that moral hazard incentives are even prevalent in the Eurozone right from the beginning (Beetsma & 
Bovernberg, 1999; Beetsma & Uhlig, 1999). Although Eurozone member states have agreed to strong economic 
governance, there are internal reasons to circumvent them. 
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In section 3, I develop a new scheme of economic governance that is necessary and sufficient for a lasting 
monetary union. Apart from rules driven by market forces, I suggest an incentive based structure to enhance 
macroeconomic competitiveness. The performance of the existing governance is ineffective due to a lack of 
incentives and domestic reservations for painful but needed structural reforms. If policy-makers are unable to 
establish either a political union or a federal union with pure market forces, i.e. a first-best solution, I suggest a 
second-best option: a gradual loss of (political) power for those countries that refuse the new binding 
governance principles of EMU. Finally, section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Method and Results 
Since the 1990s and the endorsement provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, a discussion has taken place about the 
design of economic governance in accordance to the Optimum Currency Area theory. Although economic 
governance has failed in past monetary unions, I argue that an enforceable governance scheme aligned with 
market forces can be effective. A rigours study of the past failures in the Eurozone allows us to identify the 
lessons and necessities of good governance in a monetary union. 
2.1 Flawed Macroeconomic Incentives 
Herzog and Hengestermann (2013) demonstrate that the optimum currency area literature underlines several 
desirable features of economies wanting to share a currency. However, the current framework in EMU lacks on 
effective and enforceable rules. There are too many loopholes in the governance scheme of today. Apart from 
this finding the optimum currency area (OCA) literature has also critics. Robson (1987) and Tavlas (1994) note 
that OCA criteria are difficult to measure and have a ‘problem of inconclusiveness’, as criteria may point in 
opposite directions. Nonetheless, the endogeneity of OCA theory has strengthened the potential benefits of a 
monetary union. Frankel and Rose (1998) anticipate that the positive side-effects of the euro might become 
apparent after 20 to 30 years. 
Next, I will argue that the current crisis has not emerged due to the weaknesses of OCA theory rather due to 
economic failures and flawed macroeconomic incentives. Since the Lisbon strategy in 2002, the European 
Union (EU) has endorsed economic reforms to eliminate existing malfunctions in European governance. Due to 
varying incentives, Eurozone member states have been working continuously on their economic and fiscal 
weaknesses, however, with different levels of commitment and speed. For instance Germany and Finland have 
adapted labour market reforms despite severe domestic reservations. Other Eurozone countries, however, have 
done almost nothing. For the first time since decades, many Eurozone countries enjoyed attractive credit 
conditions provided by even negative real interest rates. Thus, public and private debt accumulation was in 
vogue and the declining pressure to execute economic reforms eroded the competitiveness of the countries 
concerned continuously. In the end, this behaviour has contributed to the divergence in the current account 
balances of the Eurozone (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Current account in Billion US-$ of Euro area countries in 2010 
Source: Author, data IMF. 
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Economists have discussed the handling of uncontrolled reversals of current account imbalances for more than 
two decades. Figure 1 shows the expanding imbalances until the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and thereafter a 
gradual decline. The hidden forces behind this economic trend are the flawed incentives in macroeconomic 
governance. A closer look to Figure 1 reveals that Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal were the biggest deficit 
countries, and Germany and the Netherlands are the major surplus countries. The current account of the other 
deficit or surplus countries is negligible. If we calculate the current account in respect to GDP, we immediately 
identify Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland as the biggest deficit countries again. 
Ireland and Spain are two special cases because both had rather sound public finances before the onset of the 
financial crisis. The problem in Spain and Ireland is their relatively high private debts. Consequently, both 
economies experienced an unsustainable investment and housing boom due to flawed macroeconomic incentives 
via negative real interest rates from 1999 to 2006 (Herzog, 2012). The build-up of an asset bubble in Spain and 
Ireland as well as the inefficiency of public administrations and debt accumulation in Greece, Portugal and Italy 
demonstrate the flawed incentives. Hence, the sovereign debt crisis is not merely the consequence of insolvent 
banks and the burst of the bubble; it rather reflects governmental ignorance of enforcing the rules and 
conducting the necessary reforms. 
In addition to this problem, there is a substantial decline in competitiveness in the five troubling countries of the 
Eurozone. Wages rose faster than productivity for years, meaning that their unit labour costs, relative to their 
major rivals, were about 20 per cent higher than in 2000 (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Unit labour costs of selected Euro area countries (Index 2000 = 100) 
Source: Author, data Eurostat. 
 
Given that all countries are unable to make adjustments of the nominal exchange rate, the only way out are 
painful wage cuts. This does improve competitiveness but exacerbates the debt problems of private households. 
Moreover, it turns out that the gap in unit labour costs is caused by the wrong macroeconomic incentives rather 
than low productivity (Table 1). Simply, national wages rose faster in relation to domestic productivity dynamics 
due to flawed wage setting procedures. 
 
Table 1. Level of productivity and labour costs 
Countries 
Annual average between 2000 and 2010 in per cent
Productivity Unit Labour Costs 
Germany 0.7 1.4 
Spain 1.1 3.7 
Greece 1.9 5.0 
Ireland 1.7 3.8 
Portugal 0.6 3.3 
Discription: own calculations based on Eurostat data. 
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There is even empirical evidence that deficit countries increased wages more than surplus countries 
(EU-Commission, 2012). This fact illustrates again that economic governance has failed due to flawed 
macroeconomic incentives, missing rules and market forces. Despite some macroeconomic improvements in 
recent years there is almost no significant improvement in terms of competitiveness in Italy and France 
(Sachverständigenrat, 2012). 
2.2 Flawed Institutional Incentives 
Founding the EMU has fundamentally changed the structure of European governance especially monetary and 
fiscal interaction. All member states’ debt is now denominated in euro, without the possibility of a respective 
central bank to create the means to repay the debt. European Member states just supposed that the spill-over risk 
of default is eliminated by institutional rules, such as the no-bailout clause and the Stability and Growth Pact 
implemented in 1993 and 1997 respectively. These fiscal rules guarantee that unsound fiscal policy and thus 
default is in national sovereignty. However already in the 1990s, economists realized that the no-bailout clause 
is almost incredible due to free-riding and moral hazard incentives in the Eurozone (Beetsma & Uhlig, 1999). 
Hence, in situations of severe turmoil it was expected that the rules will be abandoned (Hellwig, 2011). 
I illustrate the institutional failures by studying the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in detail. The pact stipulates 
that budget deficits and national debts must be below of 3 per cent and 60 per cent of GDP respectively. 
Moreover, in medium term a balanced budget is a mandatory target for all EU member states. Unfortunately, 
there are approximately 60 breaches of the SGP and none of them has triggered any defined consequences. 
According to Herzog and Hengstermann (2013), ‘the pact’s Achilles’ heel was its weak enforcement provision 
and non-existent pre-emptive function.’ Indeed, the past experience confirms both a fundamental lack in 
political will to act and flawed incentives in the enforcement of European governance (Fischer et al., 2006; ECB, 
2008; 2010). There are several reasons for the weak enforcement: First of all, the opening of the pact’s 
procedure needs the backing of the EU Commission. In a second phase a qualified majority in the Council of the 
Economic and Finance Ministers (EcoFin) must approve the next steps. But the intergovernmental formation of 
the EcoFincouncil delays decision-making automatically due to heterogeneity of member states and diverse 
macroeconomic incentives. Furthermore, EU countries that ‘sinned’ retained the right to vote. In the past, the 
voting of those countries was almost always against the founding principles of sound finances, i.e. they blocked 
any enforcement of the excessive deficit procedure according to the EC regulations 1466/97 and 1467/97. An 
excellent case study is Germany, France and Italy in 2003 to 2004. They all breached the 3 per cent deficit limit 
of GDP, however, despite the unambiguous provisions in the excessive deficit procedure, the EcoFin Council 
could not even agree on sending an early warning to these countries. Consequently, as long as all countries are 
part of the decision-making procedure, especially in case of noncompliance with the pact’s provisions, EMU’s 
economic governance is doomed to fail. 
The past experience of rule enforcement in the Eurozone reveals that the procedures do not enable countries to 
internalise welfare costs and benefits in future; e.g. The impact of debt accumulation or structural reforms. In 
fact, it does not make any sense for a country to encourage sanctions for countries breaching the deficit 
threshold if you could be the next violating the rule. By the way, this experience coincides with the policy 
lessons in historical monetary unions of the past two centuries (Bordo & Lonung, 1999). They even show that 
the break-up of past monetary unions is mainly due to the fact of poor governance. 
Unsurprisingly, the architect of the pact, a former German finance minister, argued in favour of an almost 
automatic enforcement of the excessive deficit procedure. Fischer et al. (2006) summarize all existing 
possibilities to tackle the existing enforcement problem of the Stability pact. In general, there are two 
possibilities: Either the delegation of the decision-making to an independent council or an automatic voting 
scheme. The first idea of on independent council can be accomplished on lines of the Swedish Fiscal Policy 
Council (Calmfors, 2010). The second idea requires a change of the existing voting mechanism within both the 
SGP and the overall economic governance provisions. The new voting scheme would reduce the voting weight 
automatically for Eurozone members with deficits and debts above 3 per cent and 60 per cent of GDP 
respectively. Thus, the voting scheme follows the idea of policy-rules such as in monetary policy (Taylor, 1993). 
The proposed voting mechanism leads to a loss of sovereignty only in case of continued violation of the pact’s 
provisions (Herzog, 2005). This way, the voting scheme links political power to its current policy performance 
in light of the rules. The advantage of this governance scheme is three fold: A) it is like an insurance premium 
for sustainable member states. B) The voting scheme internalise the potential welfare costs of domestic policy 
decisions; and C) the loss of voting power, and thus sovereignty, provides an intrinsic incentive to national 
policy-makers to behave according to the mandatory rules in the Eurozone. Moreover, this incentive is stronger 
than the existing incentives of the sanction fee today (Herzog, 2011). Consequently, Eurozone members that 
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respect the pact’s provisions will have wide-ranging fiscal and economic sovereignty, while the flouting of the 
pact’s principles will lead to a loss of sovereignty for the countries concerned. 
Unfortunately, the current fiscal governance scheme rewards cheating. Hence, countries reject cooperation 
within the existing rules and gets away with it. Thereby other member states will be encouraged to flout the 
rules as well. Of course, this is an old phenomenon and well-known in the literature of public finance. Indeed, 
there are always incentives to overspend in fiscal policy due to the electoral business cycles and partisan 
behaviour (Nordhaus, 1975; Alesina & Tabellini, 1987). Furthermore, these incentives are even amplified in a 
currency union due to free-riding (Beetsma & Bovernberg, 1999; 2000; Dixit & Lambertini, 2003). 
Consequently, policy-makers in a monetary union have relatively few incentives for sound public finances. At 
the moment, the flawed institutional incentives unravel the economic governance scheme at all, and even create 
the famous Prisoner’s Dilemma. Eventual, we get a collapse of the euro due to the flawed institutional 
incentives. 
In addition, the current Stability pact overemphasis public deficits rather than long-run public debt and does not 
focus on both public and private debts equally. The reasons for both shortcomings are political economy 
arguments. First, a deficit is easier to observe and monitor than debts. Second, measuring sustainable debt levels 
require crucial assumptions and thus strong political value judgements. Third, the focus on just public debt 
levels is a design defect and demonstrates why Ireland, for instance, has not appeared on the radar screen of the 
European economic governance in the past years. 
Herzog and Hengstermann (2013, p. 7) demonstrate the features of efficient governance and effective fiscal 
rules as one solution for the flawed institutional incentives. Even if recent reforms in fiscal and economic 
governance pointing in this direction, they are neither sufficient nor well designed for a long-run stabilisation of 
Europe. Actually, the gradual transformation of existing governance in EMU confirms rather path dependency in 
Europe. There is no doubt, that the economic and cultural heterogeneity of EMU muddles the construction and 
execution of good governance. Hence, I argue that good governance has to respect sovereignty concerns and 
cultural heterogeneity at any time. So, the challenge is the design of European governance across independent 
countries within a supranational context. Such an approach requires at least two issues: A) permanent incentives 
to avoid moral hazard and free-riding and B) a link of supranational and home governance. Unfortunately 
EMU’s current governance, is putting all governments and the EMU at risk. 
2.3 Flawed Financial Market Incentives 
During normal times financial markets have not differentiated sufficiently between the creditworthiness of euro 
area countries. This is astonishing because the legal and institutional setting puts unambiguous responsibility to 
domestic policies. Despite clear national responsibilities, markets disbelieved the European rules since the 
beginning of the EMU in 1999. This “irrational” market behaviour remains partly unsolved. However, the 
insufficient macroeconomic and institutional incentives aligned with animal spirits in financial markets explain 
this issue sufficiently. Next, I elaborate this argument in further detail. 
Fortunately, since 2010, the financial markets responded with a reasonable assessment of creditworthiness, 
competitiveness and sustainability of Eurozone countries. However, the relative abrupt reversal of the financial 
market assessment has produced a situation similar to a bank-run. These self-reinforcing and systemic effects 
are highly contagious; i.e. they create temporary liquidity problems and evolve into enduring solvency crises in 
some countries. 
According to standard theory in finance, bond spreads reflect default risks, and default risk is determined by a 
number of fundamental variables such as government debt-to-GDP or the current account. The theory states that 
a higher government debt-to-GDP increases the burden of debt service and thus increases the probability of 
default. Hence, the bond spread widens because investors demand a higher risk premium to compensate for the 
higher default risk. A similar effect occurs for a larger current account deficit because it could be interpreted as 
an increase in net foreign debt of a country. 
Between 1999 and 2010 the bond spreads in the Eurozone were almost zero, despite the empirical divergence in 
the current account balances and public debt levels (Figure 1). Then, since the beginning of the euro crisis, 
spreads of government bonds widened significantly. But the increase in spreads was significantly larger than the 
changes in the underlying fundamentals (De Grauwe & Ji, 2012). This raises the question whether the financial 
markets may have mispriced risks or whether the orthodox bond theory is not applicable to a monetary union. 
The obvious disconnect between bond spreads and fundamentals are proven for several Eurozone countries such 
as Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
www.ccsenet.org/ijbm International Journal of Business and Management Vol. 9, No. 2; 2014 
65 
The economic rationale behind the flawed incentives of financial markets in EMU is equally trivial and obvious. 
In contrast to stand-alone countries, euro area member states do not have control over their own currency and 
thus cannot guarantee the pay-out of the bondholders. The institutional linkage to the supranational framework 
especially monetary policy eliminates the disciplinary effects of free market forces. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) sets a common interest rate for 17 euro area countries and thus triggers either positive or negative 
stimulus dependent on the stage of the business cycle. This unique interplay between national fiscal policy on 
the one hand and supranational monetary policy on the other hand, characterises the specifics of the sovereign 
bond markets in the Eurozone. In times of market stress, the divide of domestic fiscal policy and monetary 
policy is an important vulnerability. On the contrary, stand-alone countries, such as the UK, the US or Japan face 
continuously more market pressures in the run-up to the crisis. Moreover, they have all domestic policy 
measures to tackle immediate problems because they are domestically responsible for all monetary, financial 
and economic matters. 
Herzog and Müller (2013) build a model in line with De Grauwe (2012) and demonstrate the impact of flawed 
financial incentives. Suppose there are two types of traders, optimists and pessimists. Optimists (pessimists) 
have the tendency to overestimate (underestimate) the bond price. Thus, the market price bt, is different in both 
groups of traders. The optimists believe that bopt = b*+x, and the pessimists believe bpes = b*-x. In this respect, 
x > 0 and b* is the true, but unknown, bond value. The bond demand functions are 
ܦ௢௣௧,௧ ൌ ߙ൫ܾ௢௣௧ െ ܾ௧൯ܦ௢௣௧,௧ ൌ ߙ൫ܾ௣௘௦ െ ܾ௧൯                     (1) 
whereߙ ൐ 0.  Moreover, the market-maker collects the individual orders of both types of traders  ߱i,t, where i is 
the type (1 = optimist and 2 = pessimist) and t is the time period. The market value of a bond is computed by a 
standard forward equation 
ܾ௧ାଵ ൌ ܾ௧ ൅ ߛ ∑ ߱௜,௧ܦ௜,௧௜                                      (2) 
whereߛ ൐ 0 measures the speed with which the market-maker adjusts the bond price. In addition, I use the 
definition of  ߞ௧: ൌ ߱௢௣௧,௧ െ ߱௣௘௦,௧, with ∑ ߱௜,௧௜ ൌ 1 to rewrite the weighting factors, such as߱௢௣௧,௧ ൌ ሺ1 ൅
ߞ௧ሻ/2 and߱௣௘௦,௧ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߞ௧ሻ/2. Substituting both definitions and the demand equations (1a, 1b) in equation (2), 
results in: 
ܾ௧ାଵ ൌ ܾ௧ ൅ ߙߛሾܾכ െ ܾ௧ ൅ ݔߞ௧ሿ                                (3) 
Let me discuss the intuition of this equation. The variation of the bond price between two consecutive periods 
relays on two factors: (1) the price gap between the fundamental and today’s value ሺܾכ െ ܾ௧ሻ and (2) the 
portion of pessimists and optimists, ߞ௧. Thus, the bond value ܾ௧ାଵ, increases (decreases) if its fundamental 
value ܾכ is above (below) the price ܾ௧ of today.  The same effect happens, if ߞ௧ ൐ 0, i.e. the quantity of 
optimists is greater than pessimists; and vice versa for ߞ௧ ൏ 0. Interestingly, the impact of tomorrow’s bond 
value ܾ௧ାଵ is also dependent on the degree of price expectationsݔ between both types of traders. Finally, I 
close the model via modelling the dynamics of traders. Traders do not choose their trading strategy randomly 
rather on pure rational criteria. If the rule turns out to be beneficial–maximise profits–they stick to it. The profit 
function of the optimist ߨ௢௣௧,௧ and pessimist ߨ௣௘௦,௧ is simply defined as the price change ሺܾ௧ െ ܾ௧ିଵሻ times 
the quantityܦ௜,௧ or: ߨ௜,௧ ൌ ܦ௜,௧ כ ሺܾ௧ െ ܾ௧ିଵሻ. 
The numerical simulation of this behavioural model illustrates an important insight: During booms or busts there 
is animal spirit in financial markets which mean there are either more optimists or pessimists. This imbalance 
will cause the markets to overreact either positively or negatively (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Simulation of animal spirits (solid line) vs. market fundamentals (dotted line) 
 
This phenomenon is predominant in bond markets under turmoil and even amplified in the European monetary 
union due to flawed institutional and macroeconomic incentives. Hence, this model explains sufficiently the 
sudden change and behaviour of financial markets during the bond market turmoil in 2010. Altogether flawed 
incentives and animal spirits contributed to the market turmoil in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy. The 
systematic disconnection between bond market fundamentals and the respective bond yields is triggered by 
flawed supranational governance, high asymmetric information and weak reputation in public finances (Herzog 
& Müller, 2013). Thus, it is not remarkable that stand-alone countries with debt-to-GDP ratios equally high or 
even higher than Eurozone members were not affected by a similar debt crisis. On the contrary, the existing 
flawed incentives and irresponsibility in EMU’s governance has contributed to further domestic free-riding and 
moral hazard. Altogether, this may give evidence that mispricing of sovereign risk is augmented in the European 
Monetary Union. Consequently, financial markets are more fragile, vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises, and 
display less disciplining incentives in the Eurozone of today. 
The policy lesson is simple: A monetary union only works efficient if its institutional setup is based on market 
incentives and considers the effect of animal spirits sufficiently. Thus, effective governance driven by market 
forces is a solution for the Eurozone. The proposed governance scheme has to imitate market forces and prevent 
animal spirits, such as free market forces do automatically for stand-alone countries. 
3. Discussion 
In this section, we propose a new economic goverance scheme for the EMU. The major problem in the 
Eurozone is the weak and non-credible economic governance scheme including both insufficient market and 
enforcement incentives. My governance scheme is designed according to public goods theory (Coase, 1960; 
Alesina & Tabellini, 1987). In order to design good economic governance for completely different as well as 
independent countries, we distinguish two models in general. 
Model A represents a hierarchical system and is a major modification of the current policy and institutional 
structure. This model transfers almost all sovereignty over both economic and fiscal policy on the supranational 
level and thus needs a fundamental change of both domestic and European law. Indeed, the transformation of the 
Eurozone towards this model would be long and sophisticated. As long as there is no wide-ranging public 
support and political will for this direction in Europe, it is not a realistic option. 
On the contrary, model B is an effective and enhanced governance scheme aligned with market forces. This is 
closer to the current institutional setup and therefore more likely. It would strengthen the incentives and mitigate 
existing externalities for countries with sound policies. Hence, model B entails a return to the spirit of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Clearly, this governance model needs more European coordination as well. The crucial 
elements are developed in Herzog and Hengstermann (2013). 
The overall spirit of model B is that Eurozone member states bear 100 per cent responsibility for all domestic 
policy measures. Therefore, neither model can work unless the guiding principle of responsibility and control 
which rests in the same hands is re-established. This implies a credible no-bail-out clause according to Article 
125 EU-Treaty and the mandate for monetary policy to abide the prohibition of monetary financing (Article 123 
www.ccsenet.org/ijbm International Journal of Business and Management Vol. 9, No. 2; 2014 
67 
EU-Treaty) in all–even extreme–cases. Apart from a new governance scheme which enables the internalisation 
of macroeconomic differentials, we have to get rid of the arbitrary incentives of financial markets. 
Overall, both models are appropriate to tackle the current challenges. However, a combination of model A and B, 
that is, sharing the costs of unsustainable policies while retaining sovereignty, is expected to fail. This is the 
major underlying policy problem of the today’s rescue packages. All recent emergency facilities provoke moral 
hazard incentives and furthermore erode European economic governance. The proposed governance in model B, 
however, is aligned with both market incentives and automatic enforcement mechanisms. In addition, this new 
mechanism requires a tough monitoring procedure right from the beginning and regularly thereafter. 
Consequently, the new governance scheme of model B replicates the market forces of stand-alone countries and 
enhances the effectiveness of the ex-ante conditionalities of EMU’s rules. 
In Europe of today, the greatest policy failure is the execution of tough austerity programmes ex-post, and not 
ex-ante. Consequently, existing governance in Europe puts the wrong incentives at the wrong time. Likewise, 
the new governance mechanisms must strengthen pre-emptive incentives and the purpose of democratising 
Europe. Thus, the new policy environment is effectively enforced on the domestic level as long as the country 
acts in accordance with supranational rules (Oates, 1972); and over this you serve the national needs and 
democratic spirit at best. But if a country’s policy-maker fails, the supranational level would get more 
responsibility. That way it would best encourage economic growth for all European citizens. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that the crisis in the Eurozone is caused by flawed incentives in economic and 
institutional governance. To restore confidence in the EMU we need both new ideas and approaches in future. 
The proposed economic governance scheme will restore confidence and shape the currency union towards a 
better future. Thus, this proposal will not be reversing the European integration process as long as policy-makers 
return to enforceable rules aligned with market forces. However, any rule breach must trigger a certain loss of 
sovereignty and thus puts unambiguous incentives to be always in compliance with the supranational rules. This 
is necessary in the EMU because of obvious moral hazard incentives especially in comparison to governance 
schemes in stand-alone countries. A simple delegation of the enforcement task to the European Commission 
does not solve the past failures because even the Commission has failed its role as a guardian of the treaty. 
Consequently, we need in future both an automatic enforcement and market forces in European economic 
governance. As long as policy-makers stick to the spirit of model B, however without sufficient incentives to 
enforce the rules, the Eurozone is doomed to fail. 
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